As with any turnaround, motivating the software team after redundancies can be particularly difficult. Unlike manufacturing situations where firm capacity is partly dictated by the factory machinery, motivating knowledge works is considerably more difficult. Davidson (Davidson, 2001) recommends involving the staff at the emergency action phase.
Normally staff are well aware of the firm’s problems and like Teng (Teng, 2002), observes that knowledge workers can frequently feel helpless because in many cases they are more qualified than the managers (who caused the firms problems in the first place) to solve particular operational or strategic issues.
However regardless of the abilities of the staff, deep personnel cuts are still important due to cash flow constraints, and Davidson (Davidson, 2001) observes that cutting too deep is better than not cutting enough at all.
Blumling (Blumling et al., 2002) recommends putting in a new turnaround management team because like most corporate recoveries, the credibility of existing management is usually questionable at this time. He observes:
“When a company is sliding, senior executives tend to lose credibility, attrition within the ranks becomes rampant, and organisational discipline grows slack owing to poor management. The worse the situation, the more probable it is that the CEO will be forced out and an outsider brought in to manage the turnaround. A C.E.O. hired from outside is likely to turn over the management of the company in order to change its skill sets and improve its credibility.” (Blumling et al., 2002).
Even when such management changes are made, Blumling (Blumling et al., 2002) observes that unlike other turnarounds, software turnarounds often need essential skills and controls in place prior to tightening discipline. This is because the need for cost cutting is so strong (and so deep) that resolute business controls are usually needed.
Sunday, 9 May 2010
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)

No comments:
Post a Comment